The Criminality From Face Illusion by Bowyer, Kevin W. et al.
1The “Criminality From Face” Illusion
Kevin W. Bowyer, Fellow, IEEE, Michael King, Member, IEEE, Walter Scheirer, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—The automatic analysis of face images can generate
predictions about a person’s gender, age, race, facial expression,
body mass index, and various other indices and conditions. A
few recent publications have claimed success in analyzing an
image of a person’s face in order to predict the person’s status
as Criminal / Non-Criminal. Predicting “criminality from face”
may initially seem similar to other facial analytics, but we argue
that attempts to create a criminality-from-face algorithm are
necessarily doomed to fail, that apparently promising experimen-
tal results in recent publications are an illusion resulting from
inadequate experimental design, and that there is potentially a
large social cost to belief in the criminality from face illusion.
Index Terms—facial analytics, criminality prediction, computer
vision, machine learning, artificial intelligence, technology ethics.
I. INTRODUCTION
CRIMINAL or not? Is it possible to create an algorithmthat analyzes an image of a persons face and accurately
labels the person as Criminal or Non-Criminal? Recent re-
search tackling this problem has reported accuracy as high as
97% [14] using convolutional neural networks (CNNs). In this
paper, we explain why the concept of an algorithm to compute
“criminality from face,” and the high accuracies reported in
recent publications, are an illusion.
Facial analytics seek to infer something about an individual
other than their identity. Facial analytics can predict, with
some reasonable accuracy, things such as age [11], gender [7],
race [10], facial expression / emotion [25], body mass in-
dex [6], and certain types of health conditions [29]. A few
recent papers have attempted to extend facial analytics to infer
criminality from face, where the task is to take a face image
as input, and predict the status of the person as Criminal /
Non-Criminal for output. This concept is illustrated in Figure
1.
One of these papers states that “As expected, the state-of-
the-art CNN classifier performs the best, achieving 89.51%
accuracy...These highly consistent results are evidences for the
validity of automated face-induced inference on criminality,
despite the historical controversy surrounding the topic” [40].
Another paper states that “the test accuracy of 97%, achieved
by CNN, exceeds our expectations and is a clear indicator
of the possibility to differentiate between criminals and non-
criminals using their facial images” [14]. A press release
about another paper titled A Deep Neural Network Model to
Predict Criminality Using Image Processing stated that “With
80 percent accuracy and with no racial bias, the software can
predict if someone is a criminal based solely on a picture of
their face. The software is intended to help law enforcement
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Fig. 1. The “Criminality From Face” Concept. The concept is that there
are features that can be extracted by analysis of a facial image and used
to categorize the person in the image as Criminal or Non-Criminal. The
image on the left is of Thomas Doswell, who served 19 years in jail
after being convicted of a crime that he did not commit, and was freed
based on DNA evidence; see the Innocence Project for additional details
(https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/thomas-doswell/).
prevent crime. The original press release generated so much
controversy that it “was removed from the website at the
request of the faculty involved and replaced by a statement
meant to defuse the situation: “The faculty are updating the
paper to address concerns raised [13].
Section II of this paper explains why the concept of an
algorithm to compute criminality from face is an illusion.
A useful solution to any general version of the problem is
impossible. Section III explains how the impressive reported
accuracy levels are readily accounted for by inadequate exper-
imental design that has extraneous factors confounded with
the Criminal / Non-Criminal labeling of images. Learning
incidental properties of datasets rather than the intended con-
cept is a well-known problem in computer vision. Section IV
explains how Psychology research on first impressions of a
face image has been mis-interpreted as suggesting that it is
possible to accurately characterize true qualities of a person.
Lastly, Section V describes why the belief in the illusion of a
criminality-from-face algorithm potentially has large, negative
consequences for society.
II. AN ILLUSORY PROBLEM DEFINITION
Part of the criminality from face illusion is that the problem
definition is simple to state and is similar in form to that
of facial analytics with sound foundations. However, simple
thought experiments reveal the impossibility of creating any
general algorithm to correctly apply the label Criminal / Non-
Criminal to a face.
Consider a person who to a given point in their life has never
even thought of committing a crime. Assume Image A is their
face from this period. (See Figure 2.) One day this person is
inspired by what they imagine to be the perfect crime. From
the moment that idea enters their head and heart, they know
that they will commit the crime. Image B is their face from
this period. The fateful day arrives, the crime is committed,
and life proceeds well for a while. Image C is their face
from this period. But the day of arrest, trial and conviction
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2Fig. 2. Images from four different points in a person’s life. The “criminality
from face” algorithm developer must decide on ground-truth labels for the
images, which reveals their belief about the cause of the relevant features.
comes, and the person begins to serve their sentence. Image
D is their face from this period. The criminality-from-face
algorithm developer now confronts the question: what is the
ground-truth label for each of the images A, B, C and D?
Answering this question forces the algorithm developer to
face up to (pun intended) the fact that there is no plausible
foundation for the criminality-from-face problem definition.
One possible answer is to assign all four images the label of
Criminal. This requires the algorithm developer to believe in
the “born criminal” concept and also to believe that there is
something measurable from the face image that reveals this
predestined condition of a person. There have been historical
criminologists who subscribed to these beliefs; for example,
Cesare Lombroso, who will be discussed later. But today
these beliefs are regarded as having no scientific foundation.
Another possible answer is that Image A should be labeled
Non-Criminal and B, C and D should be labeled Criminal.
This answer requires the algorithm developer to believe that
the criminal intent entering the person’s head and heart causes
a measurable change in their facial appearance. Still another
possible answer is that Images A and B should be labeled Non-
Criminal and C and D labeled Criminal. This answer requires
the algorithm developer to believe that the act of committing
a crime causes a measurable change in the person’s facial
appearance. The last answer assigns Images A, B and C to
Non-Criminal and Image D to Criminal. This answer requires
the algorithm developer to believe that being convicted of
the crime causes a measurable change in the person’s facial
appearance. The last three possible answers are so untenable
that we do not know of anyone who advocates for any of them.
However, believing that a criminality-from-face algorithm can
exist requires believing in one of the four answers.
A second thought experiment highlights additional difficul-
ties in the criminality-from-face problem definition. Imagine
that a person drives from Chicago to Detroit. As the person
leaves Chicago, they begin to smoke marijuana as they drive.
This person has a medical marijuana prescription and is careful
to keep their tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) concentration below
the Illinois legal limit. Image E is a face image from this
portion of their trip. Continuing to drive, the person enters the
state of Indiana. The person assumes that Indiana law is the
same as Illinois law, but in fact Indiana has zero tolerance
for drugged driving and no exception for medical use. Image
F is a face image from the Indiana portion of the trip. The
person later crosses into Michigan, where medical marijuana
use trumps the state’s zero tolerance law for the presence of
THC. Image G is a face image from the Michigan portion of
the trip. The person is a careful driver and is never stopped
by the police on the trip. The criminality-from-face algorithm
developer again has to confront the question of assigning
ground-truth labels to images. The person did commit a crime
in Indiana, although they did not realize it, and the action that
was illegal in Indiana was legal in Illinois and Michigan.
The problem highlighted in this thought experiment is that
Criminality / Non-Criminality is a social construct that can
vary with the location and over time. Instances involving more
serious crimes than drug use include the killing of a person and
the use of “stand your ground” laws in determining criminality,
and the process of marital rape becoming a crime in the various
states of the US between the mid-1970s and mid-1990s.
Reflecting on these examples, there is nothing about con-
ceiving, committing, or being convicted of a crime that causes
any distinctive change in facial appearance. There is no dis-
tinctive feature of facial appearance that predestines a person
to become a criminal or to be unable to become a criminal.
Whether or not a given action is sufficient to allow a person to
be convicted of a crime can depend on the time and location
where the action is committed. What, then, should be made
of reports that algorithms have achieved impressive levels
of accuracy in labeling images as Criminal / Non-Criminal?
Nothing more than a basic flaw in experimental method is
required to explain the apparently impressive accuracy results.
III. ILLUSORY EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The reasoning that criminality-from-face is just an extension
of existing, sound facial analytics leads to flawed experimental
designs. In predicting age from a facial image, there are
known, identifiable features that correlate with increased age
(e.g., lines on the face), and a person’s age is the same
regardless of their geographic location. Similarly, in predicting
a person’s emotional state from a facial image, there are known
configurations of facial features that correspond to particular
emotions, and no expectation that an emotion detected in
one image reveals a permanent condition of a person’s life.
Criminality-from-face algorithms do not share any of the firm
foundational elements of other, sound facial analytics.
To better understand what goes wrong in these cases, let’s
begin with a close look at the data and experiments for the
criminality-from-face algorithm from the paper by Hashemi
and Hall [14]. This paper is important to discuss because:
(1) the authors recognize the potential for controversy, as
they state “...this studys scope is limited to the technical and
analytical aspects of this topic, while its social implications
require more scrutiny and its practical applications demand
even higher levels of caution and suspicion”; (2) remarkably
high accuracy is reported, with the authors declaring that
“the test accuracy of 97%, achieved by CNN, exceeds our
expectations and is a clear indicator of the possibility to
differentiate between criminals and non-criminals using their
facial images”; and (3) the paper appears in a peer-reviewed
journal owned by a well-regarded publisher, so we can assume
that the reviewers and editor, as well as the authors, believed
in the validity of the work.
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Fig. 3. Example Images. (a) From a NIST mughsot dataset, labeled “Crim-
inal” in [14]; (b) to (f), from FDDB, FEI, Face Place, GT and MIT CBCL
datasets, respectively, labeled “Non-Criminal” in [14].
Experimental work on criminality-from-face algorithms nat-
urally requires a dataset of face images, some of which are
labeled Criminal and some Non-Criminal. An algorithm is
trained on a subset of this data and the accuracy of the resulting
algorithm should be estimated on a different subset of the data.
It is of course essential to avoid possible sources of bias in
the data. There should be no extraneous differences between
images in the Criminal and the Non-Criminal categories. As a
trivial example, if all persons in images labeled Criminal wore
black hats and all persons in images labeled Non-Criminal
wore white hats, the algorithm might learn the difference in
color of hats, and 100% accuracy might be reported, when in
fact the algorithm is useless at detecting criminals. Meticulous
attention to the details of the experimental dataset is essential,
even more so when training deep neural networks than it is
when using “hand-crafted” features. Deep neural networks will
by their nature pick up on any consistent difference between
images in the two categories.
The face images for the Criminal category are described
as follows [14]. “A total of 8401 gray-scale mugshot images
of arrested individuals are obtained from National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Database. Images
are all in png format...Cropping the facial rectangle from the
rest of the image prevents the classifier from being affected
by peripheral or background effects surrounding the face...The
result contains 5000 front view face images of 4796 male and
204 female individuals and of variable sizes, ranging from 238
× 238 up to 813 × 813 pixels. Since neural networks receive
inputs of the same size, all images are resized to 128 × 128.”
The web page for NIST Special Database 18 [19] states
that it contains “... 3248 segmented 8-bit gray scale mugshot
images (varying sizes) of 1573 individuals”. The source of the
discrepancy in number of persons and images in the Criminal
category in [14] and in the NIST dataset [19] is not known to
us. An additional detail is that the User’s Guide for NIST
Special Database 18 [38] states that a Kodak MegaPixel1
camera was used to digitize printed mugshot photos.
The face images for the Non-Criminal category are de-
scribed as follows [14]. “A total of 39,713 RGB facial images
are obtained from five sources (Face Recognition Database,
FEI Face Database, Georgia Tech face database, Face Place,
Face Detection Data Set and Benchmark Home)...The images
are then converted to gray-scale, again to be compatible
with mugshots in the criminal dataset. The result contains
5000 front view face images of 3727 male and 1273 female
individuals and of variable size, ranging from 87 × 87 up to
799 × 799 pixels. Images are resized to 128 × 128.”
The images in the Criminal and the Non-Criminal category
are all size 128×128, all grayscale, all nominally frontal pose
and neutral expression. These factors may make it seem that
differences between the images in the two categories are
controlled. However, based on the descriptions of the data,
there are also multiple extraneous factors that have 100%
correlation with the two categories of images.
• All images for the Criminal category come from the NIST
dataset, and all images for the Non-Criminal category
come from a set of five datasets from other sources.
• All of the images labeled Criminal are photographs of
printed images and are taken in a controlled manner with
the same camera model, and all of the images labeled
Non-Criminal are photographs of live persons taken by
various cameras.
• All of the images labeled Criminal were in (lossless) PNG
format, and all of the images labeled Non-Criminal were
in (lossy) JPG format.
• All of the images labeled Criminal started out as
grayscale; all of the images labeled Non-Criminal were
converted from color to grayscale by the investigators.
Rather than the CNN learning to distinguish between Criminal
and Non-Criminal faces, it could have learned to distinguish
between (a) images converted to grayscale using the tool the
investigators used, and grayscale images from some other
source, (b) images originally in PNG and images originally in
JPG, (c) images of printed pictures of persons versus images of
live persons, or some other property also completely unrelated
to the Criminal / Non-Criminal categorization.
Also, as detailed in the User’s Guide for the NIST dataset,
the mugshots for all “criminal” face images were initially
printed photographs that were digitized using an identical
process and camera. There are several studies in automated
forensic analysis that exploit unique photoresponse non-
uniformity (PRNU) noise characteristics embedded in images
to enable camera identification (i.e., device fingerprinting) [4].
The conventional methods have evolved to include CNN based
architectures [5]. Thus, the experiment in [14] may simply
show an ability to detect printed mugshot images digitized
using the Kodak MegaPixel1 camera.
To be fair, Hashemi and Hall note the existence of con-
founding factors, before dismissing the possibility that this
had a significant effect on the results [14]. “It is noteworthy
that the criminal mugshots are coming from a different source
than non-criminal face shots. That means the conditions under
which the criminal images are taken are different than those
of non-criminal images. These different conditions refer to the
4camera, illumination, angle, distance, background, resolution,
etc. Such disparities which are not related to facial structure,
though negligible in majority of cases, might have slightly
contributed in training the classifier and helping the classifier
to distinguish between the two categories. Therefore, it would
be too ambitious to claim that this accuracy is easily general-
izable” (italics added). However, given the number of obvious
disparities between the two categories, there is no good reason
to believe that the CNN was able to learn a model of Criminal
/ Non-Criminal facial structure. We believe that it is infinitely
more likely that the “disparities not related to facial structure”
are the only thing that the CNN is using to separate the two
categories of images.
The experimental dataset used by Wu and Zhang [40] has
similar problems. The Non-Criminal images for that work
are described as follows. “Subset Sn contains ID photos of
1126 non-criminals that are acquired from Internet using the
web spider tool; they are from a wide gamut of professions
and social status, including waiters, construction workers,
taxi and truck drivers, real estate agents, doctors, lawyers
and professors; roughly half of the individuals in subset Sn
have university degrees. But the Criminal images come from
specialized sources. “Subset Sc contains ID photos of 730
criminals, of which 330 are published as wanted suspects by
the ministry of public security of China and by the depart-
ments of public security for the provinces of Guangdong,
Jiangsu, Liaoning, etc.; the others are provided by a city
police department in China under a confidentiality agreement.
We stress that the criminal face images in Sc are normal
ID photos not police mugshots. Out of the 730 criminals
235 committed violent crimes including murder, rape, assault,
kidnap and robbery; the remaining 536 are convicted of non-
violent crimes, such as theft, fraud, abuse of trust (corruption),
forgery and racketeering.” The essential point is that if there
is anything at all different about ID photos acquired from the
Internet versus ID photos supplied by a police department,
this difference is 100% correlated with the Criminal / Non-
Criminal labels and will be used by the trained CNN to classify
the images. So, just as with the experiments in [14], there is
no good reason to believe that the CNN in the experiments
in [40] was able to learn a model of Criminal / Non-Criminal
facial structure.
Beyond the problem of extraneous factors that are 100%
correlated with the image categories labeled Criminal and
Non-Criminal, there is the problem that the image categories
do not in fact have the suggested mapping to the real world.
In contrast to data used by Wu and Zhang [40], experiments
conducted by Hashemi and Hall [14] have exclusively labeled
mugshot face images as “criminal.” This is significant because
in the United States (which appears to be the source of the
mugshots) a mughsot does not indicate that a person has been
convicted of a crime. A mugshot is taken when a person
is arrested and arrives at a booking station. Searching for
“criminal,” “convicted,” or “guilty” in the README file for
NIST Special Database 18 [38] yields no hits. This labeling
is also problematic because roughly 95% of convictions in the
US are based on a defendant’s acceptance of a plea deal. It is
reported that “...15 percent of all exonerees people convicted
of crimes later proved to be innocent — originally pleaded
guilty. That share rises to 49 percent for people exonerated
of manslaughter and 66 percent for those exonerated of drug
crimes” [28]. So even mugshot subjects who are subsequently
convicted of a crime, may in fact be innocent. Just as images
in the Criminal category may in fact not represent persons who
have committed a crime, in both studies [14], [40], there is no
way to verify that every image in the Non-Criminal category
represents a person who has never committed a crime.
The concern that unintentional bias in experimental datasets
in computer vision can lead to impressive but illusory results
is very familiar to researchers. Torralba and Efros explored the
pervasive nature of the problem a decade ago in a well-known
paper [36]. They showed that standard classifiers could often
achieve surprisingly high accuracy at categorizing the dataset
an image belongs to. They pose a “fundamental question” that
is highly appropriate in the current context [36]: “However,
there is a more fundamental question: are the datasets mea-
suring the right thing, that is, the expected performance on
some real-world task? Unlike datasets in machine learning,
where the dataset is the world, computer vision datasets are
supposed to be a representation of the world.”
Bias in experimental datasets is not specific to research in
assessing criminality from face. Another instance of the prob-
lem was recently recognized in “kinship detection research.
The kinship problem is to analyze two face images and detect
if the persons have a relation such as parent-child or sibling.
The KinFaceW-II dataset was assembled and distributed to
support research in this area, and has 250 pairs of images
for each of Father-Son (F-S), Father-Daughter (F-D), Mother-
Son (M-S) and Mother-Daughter. The dataset has been used
in research publications by various researchers. But Lopez et
al. [18] pointed out that, for each kinship pair, the two face
images have been cropped from the same original image, and
that two face images cropped from the same larger image share
similarity that has nothing to do with the faces. To make the
point, they presented results comparing image pairs purely on
the chrominance distance between images (no facial analysis at
all) showing that chrominance distance actually scored higher
in kinship detection than a number of published algorithms.
Based on these results, they state, “we strongly recommend
that these data sets are no longer used in kinship verification
research”. Dataset bias in this area led to apparently impressive
accuracy that has nothing to do with the phenomenon of
interest, and similar bias can readily account for the results
in criminality from face research.
A relatively simple principle for evaluating experimental
results in facial analytics research is suggested as a reasonable
safeguard: no paper that claims to use machine learning to
predict labels for the content of images, in this case Criminal
and Non-Criminal for face images, should be accepted for
publication if its experimental data for the different labels
is 100% correlated to different sources. This would capture
kinship results in which all true kin image pairs are cropped
from a single source image, and criminality from face research
in which all Criminal images come from one source and all
Non-Criminal images come from a different source.
Some researchers may not accept our argument that pursuit
5of a criminality-from-face algorithm is doomed from first
principles to failure. Rhetorically, for them, what would be
a more convincing experimental design for their research?
Images of pairs of monozygotic twins in which one twin had a
criminal record and one did not might make a more convincing
experimental design. Images of pairs of persons, cropped from
the same group photo, where one person has a criminal record
and the second person, with no criminal record, is selected as
the most similar person in the photo might also be compelling.
This sort of dataset might be assembled from photos of sports
teams, musical groups, political groups, or other sources.
IV. CONFUSION WITH MODELS OF “FIRST IMPRESSIONS”
Wu and Zhang cite the work of Princeton psychologist
Alexander Todorov as a justification for the plausibility of
modeling criminality from faces [35], [32], [34]. However,
this justification is based on a mistaken assumption that by
modeling the first impressions of subjects viewing a face
as Todorov does, one can discern something true about the
underlying personality traits for that face’s identity. Todorov’s
research is limited to the social perception of faces, and models
his laboratory has published make predictions about what
the average person would likely say about a particular face
image [24], [31]. These predictions represent a consensus of
sorts for various attribute judgements (e.g., trustworthiness,
dominance). In Wu and Zhang’s words, the existence of
consensus judgements for certain attributes allows them to
explore the “diagnostic merit of face-induced inferences on an
individual’s social attributes” [40]. In other words, the extent
to which physiognomic cues predict personality traits, which
they believe Todorov’s work hints at.
But the existence of a consensus attribute judgement for
a particular person’s appearance does not mean that it holds
any truth about their personality. Much to the contrary of
Wu and Zhang’s claims, Todorov writes in his preface to the
book Face Value: the Irresistible Influence of First Impres-
sions [30] that “Psychologists in the early twentieth century
found little evidence for the accuracy of first impressions,
but the past decade has seen a resurgence of physiognomic
claims in scientific journals. We are told that it is possible
to discern a person’s political leanings, religious affiliation,
sexual orientation, and even criminal inclinations from images
of their face...A closer look at the modern studies shows that
the claims of the new physiognomy are almost as exaggerated
as those in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.” Given the
work Todorov has published within social psychology, it is not
surprising to learn that he is sharply critical of the idea that
one can determine criminality solely by looking at faces.
Wu and Zhang are not the only researchers that have consid-
ered Todorov’s work in the context of predicting criminality
from faces. Valla et al. conducted behavioral studies on the
accuracy of people for this task, remarkably finding that groups
of subjects were able to discriminate between criminals and
non-criminals in some cases [37]. (Wu and Zhang confirmed
to us that this is the Cornell University study that they
reference in their response to the critiques levied against their
paper [41].) Similar to Wu and Zhang, Valla et al. also believe
that Todorov’s work on first impressions demonstrates a link
between social behavior and innate traits. In order to argue
this point, they allege that Todorov has a tendency to “shy
away from the possibility of accurate impressions” based on
physiognomic cues out of “concern that it harkens back to the
stigmas associated with social Darwinism.” Thus, according to
Valla et al., Todorov’s findings can be used as a justification
for criminality-from-face studies — he simply isn’t drawing a
strong enough conclusion from his data. Of course, this line
of argumentation only makes sense if first impressions can
be shown to be reliable predictors of innate behavioral traits.
As for Valla et al.’s remarkable finding — they combined mug
shots of arrested people with photographs of innocent students
on campus in their study, such that the task performed by the
subjects was really just dataset discrimination [33].
A more recent study on the convictability of faces, also
from Cornell, does make use of photos from the same source
to show low, but above chance, accuracy for human subjects
on this task [23]. But it ultimately concludes that non-face
context is likely a significant driver of decisions, and warns
off using the results in a criminal justice context other than
attempting to understand how faces are viewed in a social
context (in the manner of Todorov).
The sound work that has been done on how humans form
subjective first impressions from a face image does not imply
that the first impression is actually true. The work that has
explored whether humans can accurately determine Criminal
/ Non-Criminal from a face image runs into the same dataset
bias pitfall as work on automated facial analytics for predicting
Criminal / Non-Criminal. A persuasive experiment for the
alleged phenomenon of humans being able to accurately
perceive the criminality of persons from their face image has
yet to emerge.
V. SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS TECHNOLOGY
Society at large should be very concerned if physiog-
nomy makes a serious resurgence through computer vision.
Algorithms that attempt to determine criminality from face
images reinforce mistaken beliefs about biology and add a
deceitful instrument to the ever growing digital surveillance
toolkit. Such technology is rooted in the Positivist School
of criminology, which has long argued that criminals are
born, not made [16]. Indeed, Hashemi and Hall directly
acknowledge Cesare Lombroso, the 19th century sociologist
who founded the Positivist School, as the motivation for
their work [14]. Inspired by the newly introduced theories of
Charles Darwin, Lombroso popularized the technique of facial
measurement for predicting criminal tendencies, arguing that
heritable flaws manifested themselves in both anatomy and
behavior [17]. Lombroso’s research was eventually discredited
on the grounds that it did not make use of valid control
groups [39], but Positivist notions persist in contemporary
thinking about criminality [8].
And it is not difficult to understand why this idea is
still attractive. Since the dawn of the genetic revolution in
biology, the general public has developed a commonly held
belief that genes code for complex behaviors (think of the
6expression “it’s in my genes”). Thus it is not a stretch to
imagine criminal behaviors having some genetic basis under
this regime. But such a simplistic belief is problematic in that it
skips several levels of abstraction, ignoring the essential role of
learning in human development [15], as well as the interplay
between the environment and a nervous system defined by
a genetic profile [27]. While there may be some correlation
between genes and complex behaviors, the mechanisms are
not currently understood, and no evidence of a direct genetic
link to criminal behavior exists [21]. A further confound
surfaces when behavioral traits must be coupled with some
physical manifestation to diagnose criminality. To justify the
plausibility of this, one could point to conditions such as the
fetal alcohol spectrum disorders, which present with abnormal
facial features and anti-social behavioral traits [26]. But the
vast majority of criminals in any country do not suffer from
such syndromes [20]. Given the variety of mental disorders
that do not present with any obvious physical abnormality
(e.g., mood disorders, schizophrenia), there can be no expec-
tation that a physical marker associated with criminality will
be present even in cases where there is some indirect genetic
basis to the behavior that led to a crime.
These misunderstandings about biology have a problematic
social implication when Positivist ideas are coupled to sys-
tems of mass surveillance. Contemporary theories of criminal
control are wrapped in scientific language in order to gain
legitimacy within the academy and dodge scrutiny from policy
makers [9]. Thus it is convenient to talk about the biology of
criminality when one needs to justify the use of a controversial
technology. As we have already pointed out, there is a logical
disconnect between legal definitions of criminality and the
body. Nonetheless, the rise of the surveillance state in the 20th
century and surveillance capitalism in the 21st was predicated
on the distortion of scientific findings. Here we discuss three
particularly troubling scenarios where artificial intelligence
(AI) has already been used in a manner that erodes human
rights and social trust, which could be further exacerbated by
the deployment of ineffective criminality from face algorithms.
The first scenario is the nation-scale use of this technology
by a government which mistakenly believes that it works as
advertised. There is growing interest in facial analytics for
surveillance purposes, and algorithms that assess visual facial
attributes have been added to that repertoire [1]. The existing
technologies that do actually work have already proven to
be controversial. In 2019, marketing material for a smart
camera system with an automatic ethnicity detector from
the Chinese technology company Hikvision surfaced [22]. In
particular, this product was advertised as being able to tell the
difference between Han Chinese, the ethnic majority in China,
and Uyghurs, an ethnic minority involved in a long-standing
conflict with the central government in Beijing. Because
Uyghurs do indeed look different than Han Chinese, they can
be detected and tracked via automated means. Under similar
reasoning, if the same is true of criminals and innocents, then
profiling with facial analytics is also possible in that case.
It is extremely troubling when facial analytics are used to
discriminate against an out-group. But it is outright reckless
for a technology that cannot possibly work to be used as if
it did. Such a scenario will lead to innocent people being
inconvenienced at best, and a senseless loss of life at worst.
Related to the first scenario is the second, which is the use
of this technology in data driven predictive policing. Instead of
widespread deployment, cameras equipped to detect criminals
could be installed in more localized “hot spots” to study their
movements so that the police would know where to look for
criminal activity in the future. There is already a lucrative
market for law enforcement products of this nature [2]. While
the ability to monitor the activities of potential lawbreakers is
tantalizing, problematic racial biases have been found in facial
recognition technologies that match surveillance photos to
mugshots [12]. Those same racial biases are likely to become
manifest in any machine learning-based system using that data,
given that they are an artifact of the data itself. It is not hard
to imagine criminality-from-face algorithms being trained with
the same databases that are currently used for other predictive
policing applications. Thus the best these algorithms can do
is reproduce available biases as their decisions, leading to a
strongly misleading picture of the criminal presence in an area.
We also find similar problems in the commercial world. One
example is the application of personality attribute prediction
for job candidate assessment. Machine learning-based person-
ality profiling is now being used as a first-round screening
process at some companies [3]. Given the uptick in interest in
AI automation, this practice will only spread. In particular,
one would expect to see such technology being deployed
extensively in the service industry to reduce hiring costs. With
more concern in service-oriented businesses about the risk of
criminal behavior on the job, there will inevitably be interest
in a capability to predict criminality from face. As with the
government surveillance and predictive policing scenarios, the
risk of this directly leading to discriminatory practices is high.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In spite of the assumption that criminality-from-face is
similar to other facial analytics, there is no coherent definition
on which to base development of an algorithm. Seemingly
promising experimental results in criminality-from-face are
easily accounted for by simple dataset bias. The concept that
a criminality-from-face algorithm can exist is an illusion, and
belief in the illusion is dangerous.
The most innocuous danger of the criminality-from-face
illusion is that good researchers will waste effort that could
otherwise create solutions that truly would benefit humanity.
A larger danger is that government and industry will believe
the illusion and expend precious resources on an effort that
cannot succeed. The most ominous danger is that belief
in the illusion will result in applications being fielded that
arbitrarily sort human beings that ”fit the description” into
the categories Criminal and Non-Criminal — with potentially
grievous consequences.
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